I hope you saw the 2005 movie, The Great Raid, or better yet, read William B. Breuer's The Great Raid: Rescuing the Doomed Ghosts of Bataan and Corregidor. The Ghost Soldiers: The Epic Account of World War II's Greatest Rescue Mission by Hampton Sides tells the same epic tale. Capt. Eugene F. Pfile played a part in that heroic adventure. His unit, the 92nd Evacuation Hospital, was brought behind Japanese lines (unbeknownst to them!), to an area held by the guerrillas in order to treat the weary and sick survivors rescued from the unbelievably cruel treatment and almost certain death at the Cabanatuan prisoner of war camp. The American commanders knew they had to get these prisoners out of the camp before taking it from Japan because as they fled an area, the Japanese modus operandi was to execute the POW's rather than let them fall into the hands of the Americans. The story unfolds on two fronts.
First, we'll get the 92nd established, then I am going to print the first part of an article written by one of the main players in the drama. Friday I will finish the article, and next week will present an article about the part the 92nd Evac played. I will intersperse it all with Gene's photos and comments.
Below is a modified Rand McNally map showing Guimba across the valley from Cabanatuan :
We moved to Guimba, NE of Tarlac - about 60 miles from Malasiqui. We had some cement highway thru a wide valley. Some irrigated patches. Rice, corn, sugar cane, tobacco, camotes (sweet potatoes), tomatoes. The wide valley, lines of trees and mountains beyond, made it resemble Colorado valleys. Some rough and dusty roads. We spent 2 hours waiting to cross the Agno river over a pontoon bridge, the highway one having been bombed and under repair. Arrived at about 4:30 P.M. and went to the primary school. Main building has 16 rooms, house for Hq and lab and pharmacy, building for the kitchen and another building with 4 large rooms. Marvelous! We've never had a thing like it. The school is at the east edge of a small town. Rice paddies, and railroad beyond. The guerrillas took the town Jan. 9 - D day. It is now their HQ. We set up a perimeter as usual. Rooms have very high ceilings. There is usually a nice breeze from the east.
Meanwhile, secret plans were already being formulated for the rescue of the prisoners. Here is the story from the Saturday Evening Post, April 7, 1945 with the home towns of the soldiers taken out for smoother reading:
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| Gene's photograph of some of the POW's rescued from Cabanatuan |
Below is a modified Rand McNally map showing Guimba across the valley from Cabanatuan :
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January 28, 1945
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| A view of Guimba with the flat fields and the mountains beyond (Cabanatuanis across those fields) |
Meanwhile, secret plans were already being formulated for the rescue of the prisoners. Here is the story from the Saturday Evening Post, April 7, 1945 with the home towns of the soldiers taken out for smoother reading:
WE SWORE WE'D DIE OR DO IT
By Henry A. Mucci, Lieutenant Colonel, USA
The commanding officer's own story of a famous raid to free American prisoners caged thirty miles behind the Japanese lines.
HQ, Lieutenant General Krueger's 6th Army, Luzon
This is the story of how a small group of American soldiers swore an oath that they would die in battle rather than let any harm befall 512 prisoners of war - almost all sick and undernourished American veterans of Bataan and Corregidor - whom they had been ordered to rescue from a prison camp thirty miles behind Japanese lines. It is, too, the record of how, by luck and God's grace, we were able to fulfill the oath we took. As their commanding officer, I cannot say too much for the courage and skill of the men who did the job against great odds.
The story begins on the morning of January twenty-seventh, when General Krueger's forces, on our way to Manila, reached the little town of Guimba, where General Krueger himself, as an enlisted man in the United States Army, was in combat on January 30, 1901, before winning his commission as a second lieutenant. Forty-four years later in the general's life, a Filipino came to his headquarters with the word that the Americans were confined in a camp at Pangatian, near a town called Cabanatuan, directly in the path of our advancing forces. Col. Morton White ... and General Krueger's staff, immediately set in motion a plan for the rescue.
As commander of the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion, I was called to headquarters, along with Lts. John E. Dove ... and William E. Nellist, ... who were to command two teams of five Alamo Scouts each in the operation. The overall plan also involved the use of two groups of guerrillas led by former soldiers in the United States Army.
We were to use 107 of our Rangers. I received some airplane photographs of the prison camp and its surroundings.
I chose C Company, under Capt. Robert W. Prince ... and one platoon from F Company, commanded by Lt. Robert J. Murphy ... to do the job.
It was decided to send out the Alamo Scout teams twenty-four hours in advance of the operation to scout the area, and it was planned to attack on the night of the twenty-ninth. The scouts left on their mission. I went back to the Rangers and briefed the men who were going to take part in this action. One of the first things I did then was to tell all the men who were going on this expedition that we would all go to church. When I got there, I made a little speech in which I asked every man to swear he would die fighting rather than let any harm come to the prisoners of war under our care. I did that because I believe in it. Everybody on the mission took that oath.
At five o'clock on the morning of the twenty-eighth, I went to Guimba. There I met Major Lapham, the former Army officer who is now in charge of a group of guerrillas. He told me that the reports that morning showed there were four tanks in the camp and that more Japanese troops had been moving in. The main road of the camp was the main artery for communications and supply for the Japanese troops who were moving in considerable strength toward the mountains in the north.
To deal with those tanks, we got our Filipino guide and marched to the headquarters of the guerrilla leader named Captain Joson. This man Joson also once was an American soldier. His headquarters at that moment was in a little barrio - meaning a cluster of Filipino huts - a few miles north of Santo Domingo. Once we left Guimba, we were in Jap-held territory. I asked him to send some men with me, as we had found that the road from Balak [sic] to the Talavera River was being used extensively by Japs. There was a battle going on around Baloc which was pretty near the prison camp, and we had to avoid all that. Captain Joson said he would give me seventy-five men and that he would go with them. We had to cross two main highways, Taboc and Rizal, before we got to the prison camp.
We left Captain Joson's headquarters at six-thirty A.M. under the cover of darkness. We went northeast across country, avoiding all barrios until we got about 500 yards from the first highway. Then I sent out scouting parties to find suitable crossing. They reported that the Jap column had recently passed down the road to Cabanatuan, but the road was clear at that time. We edged up to the road. While we hid near it in ditches and rice paddies, we heard some trucks coming along. When they passed, we got across that highway fast. When about half our men were across, six more Jap trucks came by. Our men took cover.
Finally, we all got across without discovery, and double-timed for two miles across pretty open country. There wasn't much cover, and we had to move fast. We skirted a road with a bridge which was guarded by a Jap tank and two Jap sentries. After a few miles, we came to the Rizal road. Our scouts reported that the traffic over it was light. Once again we edged up to the road, crawling, and then ran for another mile on the other side. Finally, we came to another guerrilla stronghold, where we met a force of Filipinos headed by a Captain Pajota. He also had once fought in the United States Army of the Far East. He told us that the Alamo Scouts had been there, but they hadn't sent back word yet from the prison camp.
The light was then coming, and it was forty minutes of marching to Plateros, where we originally had intended to have the rendezvous. Instead of going farther, we all holed in under cover of some busses [sic bushes]. Natives brought us rice and water. We didn't carry much food, only K rations. We didn't carry packs. About all we did carry was arms, ammunition and some cigarettes and candy to give to the prisoners when we got to them.
We lay there all day. We were near a little village called Balinkari, where a few days before, the Japs went in with nine tanks and killed about 100 people in reprisal for guerrilla activities. At four P.M. we split up into two groups and marched to Plateros. An hour later we left. Pajota's seventy-five men came along. They got there about seven o'clock. I put out some scouting parties, and we met a Filipino guerrilla who had been through the camp area disguised as a civilian. He said there were about 1000 Japs at Cabu, which was about half a mile from the prison camp. There were a lot of troops moving past it, and there were probably about 800 Japs in the prison camp itself, just resting. Tanks were moving all day along the road.
The guerrilla believed the Japs were moving up into the mountains, but couldn't be sure. He said he wasn't positive of the exact location of the houses in which our prisoners were being kept or where the tanks were. I decided not to attack that night, in view of the lack of complete information and the strength of the Jap forces around us. I sent out some Filipino scouts with our own Alamo Scouts to get more information about that camp. At three the next morning , they came back and gave me the answers to the seven questions I had asked them.
They told me how many Japs were in the camp and where they were. They told me what buildings held the tanks. They told me how the main gate was locked,and how many gates were occupied by Japs, and how many Japs there were at Cabu, and what were the best ways of approach to the camp from the north and east sides.
I had the camp mapped and, after drawing up the plan of action, we decided to attack that night. I then had the No. 1 man at a little Filipino barrio round up some carabao carts in which to bring back our American prisoners, who would be pretty weak - some would be sick and unable to make such a march. These carts were to be at the Pampananga River at 8 P.M. I also asked our Filipino friend to bring along fifty or sixty unarmed men to help carry out our prisoners who were sick. At four P.M. we began creeping or crawling over the two kilomerters to the camp. It was pretty open territory, but there were hills and bushes and a few dikes among the rice paddies, and we were pretty well strung out. At one point we had to cross the river, which was about 300 yards wide and waist deep in spots and had a fair current. I prayed that there wouldn't be any rain before we got back, because it was the kind of river that could rise a couple of feet in a very short time, and on the return we would have to cross it with carabao carts full of our sick men, and maybe wounded.
We traveled in three columns, with Captain Joson's seventy-five guerrillas on our right, Rangers in the middle and Captain Pajota's seventy-five guerrillas on our left. I had Pajota take his men to the south side of the bridge leading toward Cabu, where the main strength of the Japs was, and ordered him to set up a road block there. He agreed not to pull out except under two conditions. He could withdraw if he saw two flares from our Very pistols in the camp. That would mean we had all our prisoners out. It he withdrew, he would leaver in a northwesterly direction, pulling the Japs after him and widening the gap through which we'd bring out rescued prisoners.
Captain Joson and his Filipinos were to set up another road block about 800 yards south of the main gate with about the same instructions. They were to stop any Jap reinforcements from coming up on that side. And if there was a fight before Joson saw our flares and he had to withdraw, he would pull out in a southwesterly direction to widen the gap through which we would make our return march.
To be continued on Friday.
It was decided to send out the Alamo Scout teams twenty-four hours in advance of the operation to scout the area, and it was planned to attack on the night of the twenty-ninth. The scouts left on their mission. I went back to the Rangers and briefed the men who were going to take part in this action. One of the first things I did then was to tell all the men who were going on this expedition that we would all go to church. When I got there, I made a little speech in which I asked every man to swear he would die fighting rather than let any harm come to the prisoners of war under our care. I did that because I believe in it. Everybody on the mission took that oath.
At five o'clock on the morning of the twenty-eighth, I went to Guimba. There I met Major Lapham, the former Army officer who is now in charge of a group of guerrillas. He told me that the reports that morning showed there were four tanks in the camp and that more Japanese troops had been moving in. The main road of the camp was the main artery for communications and supply for the Japanese troops who were moving in considerable strength toward the mountains in the north.
To deal with those tanks, we got our Filipino guide and marched to the headquarters of the guerrilla leader named Captain Joson. This man Joson also once was an American soldier. His headquarters at that moment was in a little barrio - meaning a cluster of Filipino huts - a few miles north of Santo Domingo. Once we left Guimba, we were in Jap-held territory. I asked him to send some men with me, as we had found that the road from Balak [sic] to the Talavera River was being used extensively by Japs. There was a battle going on around Baloc which was pretty near the prison camp, and we had to avoid all that. Captain Joson said he would give me seventy-five men and that he would go with them. We had to cross two main highways, Taboc and Rizal, before we got to the prison camp.
We left Captain Joson's headquarters at six-thirty A.M. under the cover of darkness. We went northeast across country, avoiding all barrios until we got about 500 yards from the first highway. Then I sent out scouting parties to find suitable crossing. They reported that the Jap column had recently passed down the road to Cabanatuan, but the road was clear at that time. We edged up to the road. While we hid near it in ditches and rice paddies, we heard some trucks coming along. When they passed, we got across that highway fast. When about half our men were across, six more Jap trucks came by. Our men took cover.
Finally, we all got across without discovery, and double-timed for two miles across pretty open country. There wasn't much cover, and we had to move fast. We skirted a road with a bridge which was guarded by a Jap tank and two Jap sentries. After a few miles, we came to the Rizal road. Our scouts reported that the traffic over it was light. Once again we edged up to the road, crawling, and then ran for another mile on the other side. Finally, we came to another guerrilla stronghold, where we met a force of Filipinos headed by a Captain Pajota. He also had once fought in the United States Army of the Far East. He told us that the Alamo Scouts had been there, but they hadn't sent back word yet from the prison camp.
The light was then coming, and it was forty minutes of marching to Plateros, where we originally had intended to have the rendezvous. Instead of going farther, we all holed in under cover of some busses [sic bushes]. Natives brought us rice and water. We didn't carry much food, only K rations. We didn't carry packs. About all we did carry was arms, ammunition and some cigarettes and candy to give to the prisoners when we got to them.
We lay there all day. We were near a little village called Balinkari, where a few days before, the Japs went in with nine tanks and killed about 100 people in reprisal for guerrilla activities. At four P.M. we split up into two groups and marched to Plateros. An hour later we left. Pajota's seventy-five men came along. They got there about seven o'clock. I put out some scouting parties, and we met a Filipino guerrilla who had been through the camp area disguised as a civilian. He said there were about 1000 Japs at Cabu, which was about half a mile from the prison camp. There were a lot of troops moving past it, and there were probably about 800 Japs in the prison camp itself, just resting. Tanks were moving all day along the road.
The guerrilla believed the Japs were moving up into the mountains, but couldn't be sure. He said he wasn't positive of the exact location of the houses in which our prisoners were being kept or where the tanks were. I decided not to attack that night, in view of the lack of complete information and the strength of the Jap forces around us. I sent out some Filipino scouts with our own Alamo Scouts to get more information about that camp. At three the next morning , they came back and gave me the answers to the seven questions I had asked them.
They told me how many Japs were in the camp and where they were. They told me what buildings held the tanks. They told me how the main gate was locked,and how many gates were occupied by Japs, and how many Japs there were at Cabu, and what were the best ways of approach to the camp from the north and east sides.
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| Gene's photo of a carabao cart |
We traveled in three columns, with Captain Joson's seventy-five guerrillas on our right, Rangers in the middle and Captain Pajota's seventy-five guerrillas on our left. I had Pajota take his men to the south side of the bridge leading toward Cabu, where the main strength of the Japs was, and ordered him to set up a road block there. He agreed not to pull out except under two conditions. He could withdraw if he saw two flares from our Very pistols in the camp. That would mean we had all our prisoners out. It he withdrew, he would leaver in a northwesterly direction, pulling the Japs after him and widening the gap through which we'd bring out rescued prisoners.
Captain Joson and his Filipinos were to set up another road block about 800 yards south of the main gate with about the same instructions. They were to stop any Jap reinforcements from coming up on that side. And if there was a fight before Joson saw our flares and he had to withdraw, he would pull out in a southwesterly direction to widen the gap through which we would make our return march.
To be continued on Friday.
